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 Invented Purposes and Blue 
Sky Predictions: 
Why the Trump Administration 
Cannot Win the Medicaid Work 
Experiment Cases 
Sara Rosenbaum† 
In Stewart v. Azar,1 a federal court vacated the Trump 
administration’s decision to approve Kentucky HEALTH, a Medicaid 
work experiment that was to be carried out under § 1115(a) of the 
Social Security Act (§ 1115).2 The Stewart decision applies only to 
Kentucky’s plan. The Court expressly refused to rule on whether 
demonstrations that reduce Medicaid eligibility, such as work 
requirements, are inherently unlawful under § 1115;3 neither did the 
Court directly address the legality of the nationwide solicitation4 of  
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at George Washington University’s Milken Institute School of Public 
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member of the National Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medicine 
and the National Academy of Social Insurance and is the incoming Board 
Chair of FAIRHealth, the nation’s largest source of health care cost and 
utilization information. Professor Rosenbaum has also served on the 
CDC’s Director’s Advisory Committee and its Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practice. She previously served as Board Chair of 
AcademyHealth and the National Academy for State Health Policy. 
Professor Rosenbaum was a founding Commissioner on Congress’s 
Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission (MACPAC), which 
she chaired from January 2016 through April 2017. 
1. Stewart v. Azar, 313 F.Supp.3d 237 (D.D.C. 2018). 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2014); Section 1315(a) allows for flexibility to 
implement Medicaid at the state level by allowing states to tailor their 
programs that help promote Medicaid as long as the Health and Human 
Services Secretary approves the proposed program. But see Texas v. 
United States, 340 F.Supp.3d 579 (N.D.Tex. 2018) (holding 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1315 unconstitutional as non-severable). 
3. Stewart, 313 F.Supp.3d, at 272. Some, including this author, have argued 
that 1115 does not permit waiver designs that restrict eligibility. See, e.g., 
Nicole Huberfeld, Can Work Be Required in the Medicaid Program?, 378 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 788, 789 (2018). 
4. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., STATE MEDICAID DIRS. LETTER, RE: 
OPPORTUNITIES TO PROMOTE WORK AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 
AMONG MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES (Jan. 11, 2018), 
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Medicaid work experiments on which the administration based its 
review and approval process. But a careful parsing of the decision 
underscores the magnitude of the uphill climb the administration faces 
in attempting to move forward with § 1115 Medicaid work experiments. 
The fact that the Arkansas work experiment5 has been implemented – 
to predictably disastrous effect with mass disenrollment ongoing as of 
December 2018, that in turn caused the state and the federal  
https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/ 
smd18002.pdf. The solicitation appeared two months after a speech by 
CMS Administrator Seema Verma at the National Association of State 
Medicaid Directors. Speech: Remarks by Administrator Seema Verma at 
the National Association of Medical Directors (NAMD) 2017 Fall 
Conference, CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/speech-remarks-
administrator-seema-verma-national-association-medicaid-directors-
namd-2017-fall. The Administrator used her speech to promote work 
requirements in the context of reducing Medicaid’s size and returning it 
to what she viewed as its proper mission of insuring “the most vulnerable.” 
This reinforced the Trump Administration’s position, first expressed in a 
March 2017 letter to the nation’s Governors that “[t]he expansion of 
Medicaid through the Affordable Care Act (ACA) to non-disabled, 
working age adults without dependent children was a clear departure from 
the core, historical mission of the program.” It became clear that § 1115 
work experiments were about reducing the size of the program and 
eliminating people viewed as outside its “historical mission.” HEALTH AND 
HUM. SERVICES, LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY (2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/sec-price-admin-verma-ltr.pdf. 
5. Some recipients of Medicaid in Arkansas must work at least 80 hours 
a month. Benjamin Hardy, Update: Work Requirement Ends Medicaid 
Coverage for 4,600 more Arkansans in December, ARK. TIMES (Dec. 
17, 2018, 1:08 PM), https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/ 
archives/2018/12/17/work-rule-ends-medicaid-coverage-for-4600-
more-arkansans-in-december. Letter from Seema Verma, Administrator 
of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, to Cindy Gillespie, 
Director of Arkansas Department of Human Services (Mar. 5, 2018) 
https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ar/ar-works-ca.pdf (approving the 
Arkansas work amendment to its previous 1115 Medicaid “private option” 
demonstration). See J. Craig Wilson & Joseph Thompson, Nation’s First 
Medicaid Work Requirement Sheds Thousands from Rolls in Arkansas, 
HEALTH AFF. (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/ 
hblog20181001.233969/full/. The magnitude of the harm caused by the 
Arkansas experiment has been considerable enough to prompt the 
Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission (MACPAC), an 
advisory body to Congress, to call for a “pause in disenrollment” until 
federal and state officials could ascertain the reasons underlying 
widespread (in excess of ninety percent) failure to comply with reporting 
rules. See PENNY THOMPSON, MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS 
COMM’N, LETTER TO SECRETARY ALEX AZAR (Nov. 8, 2018), 
https://www.macpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MACPAC-
letter-to-HHS-Secretary-Regarding-Work-Requirements-
Implementation.pdf (regarding Arkansas Medicaid work requirement). 
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government to already begin modifying its crucial reporting 
requirements – simply has happened because the lawsuit to stop it was 
not filed until several months after its June 1, 2018 start date.6 
To be sure, each effort to stop an approved Medicaid work 
experiment likely will be fought on its own terms, given the fact that it 
is the actualization, not the concept, that a court (presumably the same 
court in each case, since they all are expected to be filed in the District 
of Columbia Circuit) is reviewing. Indeed, at least in minor respects, 
the approved demonstrations can differ on matters such as the ages of 
the people subject to the requirement, the precise scope of the 
exemptions, the work and reporting rules, and other related factors.7 
But in the end, Stewart points to the degree to which, as broad as 
§ 1115’s experimental authority might be, the reach simply is too far 
where an idea as fundamentally problematic in both concept and 
execution as a work requirement is concerned. To be sure, other § 1115 
demonstrations, which historically have laid the foundation for some of 
Medicaid’s most important advances in the areas of eligibility, coverage, 
and program administration,8 have tested eligibility restrictions. This is 
most clearly the case with Indiana,9 which received permission from the 
Obama Administration, as part of its Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
Medicaid expansion demonstration, to test premiums whose scope not 
 
6. Gresham v. Azar, No. 1:18-cv-01900 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 14, 2018). 
7. The Kaiser Family Foundation, as it does with all things Medicaid, offers 
an excellent tracker that provides pretty much real-time, detailed 
information on each § 1115 Medicaid work demonstration as well as other 
§ 1115 projects. Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Approved and Pending Section 
1115 Waivers by State, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., 
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-waiver-tracker-
approved-and-pending-section-1115-waivers-by-state/ (last updated Jan. 
23, 2019). As of this date, seven state Medicaid work requirement 
demonstrations had been approved, with another eight pending. 
8. Sara Rosenbaum & Carla Hurt, How States Are Expanding Medicaid 
to Low-Income Adults Through Section 1115 Waiver Demonstrations, 
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Dec. 2014), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/documents/
_media_files_publications_issue_brief_2014_dec_1794_rosenbaum_s
tates_expanding_medicaid_section_1115_rb_v3.pdf. 
9. Approval of Indiana can be found at CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND 
MEDICAID SERVICES EXPENDITURE AUTHORITIES, NO. 11-W- 00296/5, 
HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN, (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.in.gov/fssa/ 
hip/files/IN-HIP-1115-Approval-Package_2-1-2018.pdf. An explanation 
of the Indiana demonstration can be found in MaryBeth Musumeci et al., 
Approved Changes in Indiana’s Section 1115 Medicaid Waiver Extension, 
HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.kff.org/ 
medicaid/issue-brief/approved-changes-in-indianas-section-1115-
medicaid-waiver-extension/. 
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only exceeds the rules normally allowed under federal Medicaid law10 
but that also are tied, for certain beneficiaries, to disqualification (i.e., 
lockout) periods for nonpayment. Yet as harsh as the Indiana policy is, 
the terms of the demonstration permit certain mitigation steps (such as 
premium payments by third parties), more importantly, the Indiana 
demonstration, in the end, represents a tough but logical extension of 
existing Medicaid policies governing premiums. 
Work requirements, on the other hand, represent a whole new 
ballgame in Medicaid. They amount to an eligibility restriction never 
enacted by Congress as an independent Medicaid condition of 
coverage.11 The experiments rest on logic that simply does not 
withstand even limited scrutiny, require a suspension of disbelief 
regarding Medicaid’s purposes, and are premised on assertions 
regarding their potential to produce a beneficial impact that are simply 
untethered from all known evidence. Although arguably § 1115 offers 
precisely the vehicle for testing new coverage policies, bootstrapping a 
work experiment into § 1115 is simply an impossibility.12  
10. An explanation of how the Indiana premiums differ from what is normally 
permitted under federal law, thereby necessitating a waiver of federal law 
under §1115(a), can be found in Alexandra Gates et al., Healthy Indiana 
Plan and the Affordable Care Act, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 
18, 2013), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/fact-sheet/healthy-indiana-
plan-and-the-affordable-care-act. Essentially Indiana is permitted to 
impose premiums on beneficiaries who otherwise would be exempt under 
Medicaid’s premium provisions (i.e., people with incomes under 150 
percent of the federal poverty level) and to disqualify for a fixed period of 
time (i.e., lock out) people with incomes above 100 percent of poverty 
who fail to pay their premiums. 
11. Legislation that passed the House of Representatives in 2017 and was 
pending in the Senate would have given states the option to include work 
as a condition of eligibility. See American Health Care Act, H.R. 1628, 
115th Cong. §§ 117, 130 (2017); Better Care Reconciliation Act, H.R. 
1628, 115th Cong. (2017). The 1996 welfare reform legislation authorizes 
states to deny Medicaid to recipients of Temporary Aid to Needy Families 
(TANF) who fail to comply with TANF work requirements. For a 
discussion regarding states considering extending disqualification from 
Medicaid or Supplemental Nutrition Assistance (SNAP) benefits in the 
case of TANF recipients who experience lost or reduced benefits. See 
LaDonna Pavetti, TANF Studies Show Work Requirement Proposals for 
Other Programs Would Harm Millions, Do Little to Increase Work, CTR 
ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/ 
research/family-income-support/tanf-studies-show-work-requirement-
proposals-for-other-programs-would. 
12. In another era, a demonstration carrying as much risk of harm to the poor 
as mandatory Medicaid work experiments are proving to do would not 
have gone forward but would have been stopped as experiments on human 
subjects that grossly exceeded the minimal level of risk allowed in social 
welfare experimentation. In 1983, however, the Reagan Administration 
eliminated § 1115 demonstrations from the protective umbrella of the 
Common Rule governing federally assisted research on human subjects. 
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The Stewart decision rested on a crucial consideration, namely, 
whether a work requirement could be said to be “likely to assist in 
promoting the objectives”13 of the Medicaid program. As a result, the 
decision came down to two questions. First, what is the purpose of 
Medicaid? Second (assuming that Medicaid’s purposes are broad 
enough to encompass ones that would disqualify people from coverage 
if they do not satisfy work and reporting rules), under what set of facts 
could such an experiment proceed, and what evidence would need to be 
presented to a court to make the decision a reasonable one? Thus, if 
the Trump administration is to prevail, it will need to convince a court 
of two things: first, that Medicaid’s purposes extend beyond the 
provision of medical assistance, since virtually all proposed work 
demonstrations show a reduction, rather than an expansion, of 
eligibility;14 and second, that evidence supports a decision to proceed 
because the benefits to be gained in advancing Medicaid’s additional – 
and arguably competing – purposes outweigh the loss of coverage. 
That the circumstances that gave rise to the Stewart case will recur 
is not open to debate. Multiple states are seeking to replicate work 
experiments. The Arkansas demonstration, which removed yet another 
4600-plus people from Medicaid in November 2018,15 is in litigation 
now. In November 2018, in the wake of the decision vacating his initial 
approval, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) re-
approved the Kentucky work experiment with virtually no changes,16 
 
No administration since has restored the protections. A question for 
another day is whether, apart from the Common Rule, a demonstration 
that fails to carry safeguards against risks to human subjects could be 
considered arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure 
Act. See Sara Rosenbaum, Weakening Medicaid From Within, AM. 
PROSPECT (Oct. 19, 2017), https://prospect.org/article/weakening-
medicaid-within. 
13. Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 254 (D.D.C. 2018). 
14. See, e.g., Sara Rosenbaum et al., State 1115 Proposals to Reduce Medicaid 
Eligibility: Assessing Their Scope and Projected Impact, COMMONWEALTH 
FUND (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/ 
2018/state-1115-proposals-reduce-medicaid-eligibility-assessing-their-
scope-and-projected (reviewing work experiment proposals submitted to 
date). 
15. ARK. DEP’T HUMAN SERVS., ARKANSAS WORKS PROGRAM (2018), 
http://d31hzlhk6di2h5.cloudfront.net/20181217/79/92/18/6e/eeaf1dc670
1dc28a1244276a/181217_AWreport.pdf. 
16. See PAUL MANGO, CTR. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., LETTER TO CAROL 
H. STECKEL (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-
Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ky/ky-
health-ca.pdf. The second approval letter is in part a rubber stamp of the 
first approval, in part a defense of the agency’s insistence on creating new 
purposes for Medicaid that in turn would enable approval of a 
demonstration whose impact is to remove people from the program, and 
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and the latest decision is now subject to a new challenge.17 In renewing 
his approval, the Secretary employed the same arguments regarding 
purpose, once again ignored the impact of the experiment on coverage 
for tens of thousands of people, and made the same baseless, evidence-
free assertions regarding the positive impact of the plan on which he 
had relied in the first approval and that were discredited by the Court 
in its decision. With a total of five work experiments approved, and at 
least ten in the pipeline,18 this is a good time to explore Stewart in more 
depth. 
As in other cases that have challenged the legality of § 1115 
experiments, the starting point for the Court was to ascertain the 
purpose of Medicaid, since § 1115 is confined to experiments that the 
Secretary finds are “likely to assist in promoting” the objectives of the 
Social Security Act program that is the subject of the demonstration.19 
Under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard governing judicial review,20 the court concluded that its duty 
was to review the legality of the work experiment (known as Kentucky 
HEALTH)21 “as a whole,”22 rather than approaching each experimental 
element piecemeal. This meant a review of a bundled package that 
included: work and reporting requirements; elimination of retroactive 
Medicaid eligibility for certain populations; coverage and benefit 
restrictions; higher patient cost-sharing; and imposition of lock-out 
periods for failure to comply with work and related reporting 
requirements as other new requirements related to the annual 
redetermination process and notifying the state regarding changes that 
could affect eligibility. Each element required separate waivers under 
§ 1115(a) of underlying federal law; together they made up a single, 
integrated experimental approach to Medicaid, now under review. The 
 
in part an explanation of why public commenters erred in believing the 
state’s own estimates in its 2017 proposal that over 95,000 people would 
lose coverage by the demonstration’s fifth year. 
17. Id. 
18. Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Approved and Pending Section 1115 Waivers 
by State, supra note 7. 
19. Stewart v. Azar, 313 F.Supp. 3d. 237, 260 (D.D.C. 2018). 
20. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2012). 
21. Kentucky HEALTH actually is part of a larger demonstration known 
(confusingly) as KY HEALTH. See discussion of scope of review, Stewart, 
313 F. Supp. 3d at 257. KY HEALTH in its entirety also included 
experimental expansion of access to residential substance abuse treatment 
services beyond that normally allowed under federal law. Plaintiffs did 
not challenge this component of the state’s demonstration, and the court 
concluded that this portion of the approval was legally separate and 
distinct from Kentucky HEALTH.. 
22. Stewart, 313 F.Supp. 3d. at 257. 
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purpose of this bundled approach to Medicaid, according to the 
Secretary, was to promote Medicaid’s purposes, which he defined as 
“improv[ing] health outcomes, promot[ing] increased upward mobility 
and improved quality of life, increas[ing] individual engagement in 
health care decisions, and prepar[ing] individuals who transition to 
commercial health insurance coverage to be successful in this 
transition.”23 
The question, according to the Court, was whether this bundle in 
fact was approvable; that is, “whether the Secretary acted arbitrarily 
or capriciously in concluding that Kentucky HEALTH was ‘likely to 
assist in promoting the objectives’ of the Medicaid Act.”24 The Court 
stressed that its role was simply to determine whether the Secretary 
had engaged in “reasoned decisionmaking” involving consideration of 
all relevant and “salient factor[s]” and evidence in order to assess 
whether the decision rested on more than “conclusory statements” or 
“entirely [failed] to consider an important aspect of the problem” and 
“the consequences of his actions.”25 Under the Chevron doctrine, this 
meant deferring to the governing agency in the event of statutory 
ambiguity.26 
But in this case, the Court concluded, there was no need to give 
deference since the statute is clear as to its purposes. In determining 
purpose, moreover, the Court looked not simply to the traditional 
source that courts consult – Medicaid’s appropriation provision27 – but 
to the fuller Medicaid text.28 
The appropriations provision specifies that the purpose of Medicaid 
is, in pertinent part, to enable 
each State, as far as practicable under the conditions in such 
State, to furnish (1) medical assistance . . . [to] individuals[] 
whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of 
necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and other 
services to help such families and individuals attain or retain 
capability for independence or self-care.29 
 
23. Id. at 262. 
24. Id. at 259. 
25. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
26. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984) (establishing the basic doctrine that guides judicial review of 
administrative decisions). 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(1) (2018). 
28. Stewart, 313 F.Supp. 3d. at 260. 
29. Id. 
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But this section of the law dates to 1965 – nearly a half century 
prior to the ACA Medicaid expansion – and focuses only on those 
populations whose eligibility was established under the original law. For 
this reason, the Court also looked to subsequent amendments to that 
section of the law defining who is entitled to medical assistance, 
including the eligibility expansions to the statute codified as part of the 
ACA.30 
Through this further examination of Medicaid’s statutory text 
adding new eligibility groups to those entitled to receive medical 
assistance, the Court concluded that the purpose of the law, as 
expressed in its appropriation provision, in fact clearly extended to all 
eligibility groups subsequently added to the statute – from the pregnant 
women added in 1984 as a new and distinct eligibility group through 
the low income working-age adults not otherwise eligible for Medicaid 
under traditional program rules, as added by the ACA. All subsequently 
added groups, according to the Court, clearly enjoy the same statutory 
purpose as those eligibility categories contained in the initial law. 
Indeed, no other conclusion was possible in the Court’s view given the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in National Federation of 
Independent Businesses v Sebelius,31 which interpreted the ACA’s 
Medicaid statutory amendments as having transformed Medicaid from 
its original limited role into “an element of a comprehensive national 
plan to provide universal health insurance coverage.”32 Because 
Kentucky had expanded its plan in 2014 to include ACA adults, those 
adults became part of the State’s coverage plan, entitled to protections 
no less stringent in an experimental context than those accorded other 
beneficiaries.33 This meant, in turn, that their fate under the 
demonstration became a “salient factor” in the federal review process. 
For this reason, it became fatal to the approval that the Secretary 
simply ignored the impact of putting health insurance at risk for tens, 
if not hundreds, of thousands of people. By the Secretary’s own 
admission, agency review was confined to confirming the assertions of 
its own officials34 that the demonstration would improve health 
outcomes, address behavioral and social factors that influence health, 
 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2018). 
31. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 583 (2012). 
32. Id. 
33. Louise Norris, Kentucky and the ACA’s Medicaid Expansion, HEALTH INS. 
(Nov. 25, 2018), https://www.healthinsurance.org/kentucky-medicaid/; 
Stewart, 313 F.Supp. 3d. at 261. 
34. Stewart 313 F.Supp. 3d at 261. See supra note 4 regarding the speech by 
CMS Administrator Seema Verma. 
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incentivize beneficiaries to engage in their own health care, and 
familiarize beneficiaries with commercial insurance design:35 
While those may be worthy goals, there was a notable omission 
from the list: whether Kentucky HEALTH . . . would help 
provide health coverage for Medicaid beneficiaries. That is, would 
Kentucky HEALTH help or hurt states in “funding . . . medical 
services for the needy”? By his own description, the Secretary 
“entirely failed to consider” that question.36 
So completely did the Secretary ignore this central question that he 
never provided a bottom-line estimate of how many beneficiaries would 
lose coverage.37 Furthermore, despite an administrative record replete 
with comments regarding likely coverage losses over the life of the 
experiment as a result of the new eligibility restrictions and “clerical 
and tracking errors” that surely would follow,38 the Court found that 
“the record contains a rather stunning lack” of discussion about the 
effects of the demonstration on health coverage.39 
The only sign that the Secretary understood the coverage impact 
was the presence of the exemptions he approved under the state’s 
proposals. This, according to the Court, was “[no] answer at all,”40 
stating “[a]lthough Kentucky’s initial project may have thus included  
35. Stewart 313 F.Supp. 3d at 261-262. 
36. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
37. The state estimated a loss of 95,000 beneficiaries by the fifth year of the 
experiment, while scholar amici estimated losses of between 175,000 and 
297,000 – about two-thirds of Kentucky’s total expansion population. Id. 
38. Id. at 262-63. 
39. Id. at 263. 
40. The January 2018 solicitation (DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. supra, note 
4), identified certain exemptions that states’ applications would be 
expected to contain, with no discussion of the risks facing non-exempt 
beneficiaries. The January 2018 solicitation did not discuss the potential 
effects of the demonstration on non-exempt populations, other than to 
predict, based on no evidence, that people would experience a rise in 
income, greater access to health insurance, and better health. In the 
second Kentucky approval letter, issued November 20th, the Secretary for 
the first time seemed to acknowledge the risks facing those losing 
insurance. CMS added the following specific condition to its “Waiver List” 
accompanying the approval letter, at Paragraph 47: “Provide each 
beneficiary whose eligibility has been suspended with information on how 
to access primary care and preventative [sic] services at low or no cost to 
the individual. This material will include information about free health 
clinics and community health centers including clinics that provide 
behavioral and substance use disorder services. Kentucky shall also 
maintain such information on its public-facing website and employ other 
broad outreach activities that are specifically targeted to beneficiaries 
whose eligibility has been suspended.” PAUL MANGO, supra note 16. 
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adequate protections for ‘vulnerable’ individuals, this was not enough 
for the Secretary to rubber-stamp it. . . . The Secretary . . . cannot 
limit his review to only ‘vulnerable individuals.’ . . . He must consider 
coverage to all groups enrolled in the project.”41 
Thus, the existence of exemptions for some did “not establish that 
the Secretary [had] ‘adequately analyzed’ coverage loss” for the 
majority of beneficiaries subject to the experiment.42 
The Secretary then attempted to argue that in fact the 95,000 
pegged to lose their coverage might not do so at all but “maybe . . . will 
instead transition to ‘employer-sponsored and commercial coverage.’”43 
To this the Court pointed out that, in fact, the Secretary had made “no 
such finding:”44 
While the agency spoke generally of “creating incentives for 
individuals to obtain and maintain coverage through private, 
employer-sponsored insurance,” it cited no research or evidence 
that this would happen, nor did it make concrete estimates of 
how many beneficiaries might make that transition. And, of 
course, it is not obvious that the community–engagement 
requirement alone would help a person shift to private insurance. 
As the Secretary stresses, this is not a work requirement; 
individuals can meet it, for example, by volunteering . . . . While 
those unpaid activities may have long-term benefits, he never 
discussed how they will promote a “transition from Medicaid to 
commercial coverage.” 
The Court thus cannot credit the Secretary’s speculations now. 
“[T]he mere fact that there is some rational basis within the 
knowledge and experience” of the agency, “under which [it] might 
have justified its conclusion, “will not suffice to validate agency 
decisionmaking.” . . . Although it may “uphold a decision of less 
than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be 
discerned,” it cannot infer an agency’s reasoning from mere silence 
or where the agency failed to address significant objections and 
alternative proposals.45 
In the end, it is no surprise that the Secretary simply sought to 
change the subject by inventing new purposes for Medicaid, followed 
by evidence-free, blue-sky predictions regarding the benefits of a work 
requirement. Even a cursory review of the literature on the effects of 
 
41. Stewart, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 263-264. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 264. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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work on health shows that work has no causal impact on health; at 
most, the evidence shows that working simply reflects better health.46 
Furthermore, all available evidence, much from government-funded 
research, shows that work requirements in public assistance programs 
have, at best, limited short-term effects on income and fail to produce 
lasting effects.47 A deluge of government data show that poor part-time 
workers generally have limited access to employer benefits, even when 
working.48 One study focusing on Arkansas (like Kentucky, a high 
poverty southern state) found that in 2017, exactly 5.2% of small firms 
offered employee health benefits to their part-time workers.49 
Furthermore, the evidence is positively overwhelming regarding the 
impact of Medicaid on access to coverage and care.50 It should come as 
no surprise that the Secretary wanted to avoid this evidence, both 
generally as well as the evidence submitted (twice) for the record.  
46. Larisa Antonisse & Rachel Garfield, The Relationship Between Work and 
Health: Findings from a Literature Review, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND. (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-
relationship-between-work-and-health-findings-from-a-literature-review/; 
Brief for Deans, Chairs, and Scholars as Amici Curiea in Support of 
Plaintiff at 16, Stewart v. Azar 313 F.Supp. 3d. 237 (2018) (Civil Action 
No. 18-152 (JEB)). 
47. Brief of Deans Chairs and Scholars, supra note 46; Pavetti, supra note 11. 
48. Among poor adults ages eighteen through sixty-four, seventeen percent 
nationwide have access to employer benefits. In Kentucky this figure is 
eleven percent. See Health Insurance Coverage of Adults 19-64 Living in 
Poverty (under 100% FPL), HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2017), 
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/poor-adults/?current 
Timeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort
%22:%22asc%22%7D. The evidence shows that half of poor working-age 
adults are working. Leighton Ku & Erin Brantley, Medicaid Work 
Requirements: Who’s At Risk?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Apr. 12, 2017), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170412.059575/full/. 
These two figures, taken together, suggest that employer benefits are a 
rarity for poor workers. 
49. Emily M. Johnston et al., Arkansans Losing Medicaid Due to Work 
Requirements are Likely to Face Limited Private Insurance Options, 
URBAN WIRE (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.urban.org/urban-
wire/arkansans-losing-medicaid-due-work-requirements-are-likely-face-
limited-private-insurance-options. 
50. Sara Rosenbaum et al., Will Evaluations of Medicaid 1115 
Demonstrations That Restrict Eligibility Tell Policymakers What They 
Need to Know?, COMMONWEALTH FUND, (Dec. 2018), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2018/dec 
/evaluations-medicaid-1115-restrict-eligibility; Larisa Antonisse et al., 
The Effects of Medicaid Expansion under the ACA: Updated Findings 
from a Literature Review, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Mar. 28, 
2018), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-effects-of-medicaid-
expansion-under-the-aca-updated-findings-from-a-literature-review-
march-2018/. 
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Perhaps the biggest irony of all is that, despite reinventing 
Medicaid as a program whose purpose is to improve health through self-
sufficiency, the Trump Administration’s own January 2018 solicitation 
to state Medicaid Directors made it clear that demonstration states 
would not be able to use federal Medicaid funds for education, job 
training, or employment supports. In other words, states would be 
entirely on their own for (the not inconsiderable) costs associated with 
community engagement, including job training, job placement, 
employment supports, other community engagement programs, and job 
development in underserved, highly impoverished communities where 
jobs are scarce. Despite evidence that work programs aimed at the poor 
are effective only where well-funded and well-developed,51 the 
administration declared states ineligible, under the terms of the 
solicitation, to use federal Medicaid financing to offset these job creation 
efforts and barred states from applying federal savings from enrollment 
reductions toward such programs.52 No wonder. The purpose of 
Medicaid is to provide medical assistance, not to support work 
programs. 
Faced with these facts, the Court did the inevitable and vacated 
Secretarial approval: 
At bottom, the record shows that 95,000 people would lose 
Medicaid coverage, and yet the Secretary paid no attention to 
that deprivation. Nor did he address how Kentucky HEALTH 
would otherwise help “furnish . . . medical assistance.” In other 
words, he glossed over “the impact of the state’s project” on the 
individuals whom Medicaid “was enacted to protect.” By doing 
so, he “failed to consider adequately” a salient purpose of 
Medicaid and, thus, an important aspect of the problem.53 
As noted, the Secretary has now approved Kentucky HEALTH a 
second time. This time, to his arsenal of new purposes and blue-sky 
claims, he has attempted to reframe Kentucky HEALTH not as a 
sanctioned experiment in reducing coverage but as an experimental 
expansion, on the ground that the state is free to eliminate the 
expansion group at any time. As noted, although there is precedent for 
§ 1115 eligibility expansions that allow expansion under more limited 
conditions, using § 1115 to cull the rolls has never been permitted. It is 
one thing to, as Indiana was permitted to do in the case of enforceable 
premiums, extend what are already statutorily optional eligibility  
51. Leighton Ku et al., Medicaid Work Requirements: Will They Help the 
Unemployed Gain Jobs or Improve Health?, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Nov. 
6, 2018), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-
briefs/2018/nov/medicaid-work-requirements-will-they-help-jobs-health. 
52. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 4, at 8. 
53. Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 265 (D.D.C. 2018). 
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conditions to additional groups on an experimental basis. It is quite 
another to use § 1115 to reduce enrollment through eligibility 
restrictions that have never been independently sanctioned by 
Congress. Indeed, given the reasoning in Stewart, it is hard to believe 
that experiments aimed at removing enrolled beneficiaries from the 
program would ever be consistent with § 1115. As the court reasons, a 
clear reading of the statutory text extends Medicaid’s purpose – to 
provide medical assistance to eligible people – to all program 
beneficiaries. Thus, in order to exercise his authority, the Secretary 
must show that he considered the impact of the demonstration on all 
affected populations, not only those whom he professes to treat as the 
“most vulnerable.” Medicaid § 1115 demonstrations are not some sort 
of exercise in population beneficence, they are intended to help 
policymakers gain a better understanding of how best to promote the 
program’s purposes. This positive purpose underlays the origins of 
§ 1115,54 and it remains true today.55 
There may come a time when Congress decides to give states 
program options to introduce general restrictions or to cover less than 
the full expansion group. But for now, § 1115 is not a mechanism for 
rationing health care or causing collateral damage for some warped 
perception of the greater good. It is a means of making Medicaid work 
better for all who are entitled to it.56 
 
 
54. Brief of Deans Chairs and Scholars, supra note 46, at 9. 
55. See About Section 1115 Demonstrations, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/section-1115-
demo/about-1115/index.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2019). 
56. On March 27, 2019 the District of Columbia District Court found changes 
unresponsive to the instructions on remand and the Kentucky vacatur was 
reaffirmed and extended to Arkansas. Sara Rosenbaum & Alexander 
Somodevilla, Inside the Latest Medicaid Work Experiment Decisions: 
Steward v Azar and Gresham v Azar, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Apr. 2, 2019), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190402.282257/full/. 
